I want to thank you for the privilege of appearing

here today. I have been involved with Korea since I first

went there in the Army in 1946 in counterintelligence, later returned

as an educational missionary, and more recently served as

Ambassador, so Korea is something that is close to my heart and

to all of our concerns.

In my mind there are three parts to our Korea policy. The first

is to maintain with our staunch ally, Seoul, a robust and unassailable

deterrence, the second is to support the South’s initiatives toward

the North in reducing tension and encouraging Pyongyang to

open up to the rest of the world, the third is for the United States

to engage the North in negotiations designed to end the threat of

nuclear weapons and missiles on the peninsula.

The first, the United States must continue to invest in the U.S.-

ROK security partnership. That alliance has been extraordinarily

successful in underpinning stability in Northeast Asia not just on

the peninsula and establishing a position of strength from which

South Korea could test reconciliation with the North.

Seoul has clearly stated that the U.S. military will remain critical

to its security even after the North Korean threat has gone,

whenever that might be. It is consistent with Seoul’s efforts at reconciliation

for the U.S. and ROK Governments to point in specific

terms to the North Korean threat and to continue reinforcing deterrence,

particularly in the areas of counter-battery fire missile defense

and protection against weapons of mass destruction. The

United States should improve U.S.-ROK joint readiness in these

areas and begin preparing the alliance relationship for a longer

term role in regional security.

Second, South Korea has made important progress in tension reduction

with the North, and should have U.S. support. Seoul’s

strategy of cooperation and reconciliation with North Korea has

moved the political dynamics on the peninsula in a positive direction.

It is true that without a reduction of the North Korean military

threat and improvement in human rights in the North, diplomacy

with Pyongyang can only go so far. That is a given. However,

these should be the goals of our policy and not preconditions for the

South’s efforts at tension reduction. Kim Dae-jung’s focus on reconciliation is the right way to begin the process and is clearly in

U.S. interests, and we should offer full support for his initiatives.

Third, it is in the U.S. interest to negotiate a verifiable elimination

of North Korea’s long-range missile program. Last year,

North Korea appeared interested in negotiating a comprehensive

agreement to reduce its long-range ballistic missiles in exchange

for various inducements. Such an agreement cannot be achieved

without lengthy and deliberate negotiations, followed by effective

verification measures. Nevertheless, the scope of North Korea’s proposal

was unprecedented, and the North would have prohibited all

exports of long-range missiles and related items in exchange for inkind

assistance in such categories as food and medicine.

In addition, the North said it would ban further indigenous testing

and production above a certain range, in exchange, again, for

in-kind compensation. However, in working level talks the North

balked at intrusive verification, did not address their deployed missiles,

and remained vague about the threshold of the long-range

missiles. For that reason, there were no talks.

The United States should resume talks on missiles in the near

future, but should make the bottom line clear: effective verification,

elimination of long-range missiles, a danger that the chairman has

pointed to, provision of in-kind assistance to the North that would

not include sensitive technology, and a movement toward subsequent

steps to reduce tensions in the conventional military threat.

If those objectives can be met, a broad agreement with North

Korea on missiles would be significant accomplishment, and would

enhance stability in northeast Asia, and the South’s efforts at reconciliation.

In the meantime, I think the United States should invite

its allies to review the Agreed Framework but without any

unilateral changes by any party. For that reason, I defer to Ambassador

Gallucci’s comments.

The 1994 Agreed Framework has frozen North Korea’s known

nuclear weapons. Any review should focus on both remaining challenges

to full implementation of the Framework Agreement as well

as opportunities to engage North Korea on a revision of the terms

to meet Pyongyang’s immediate energy needs. I would also want to

say that the United States would be wise to continue its energetic

trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan coordination.

Pyongyang’s new diplomacy is the result of three developments,

no change of heart, its desperate economic situation, Kim Daejung’s

patient diplomacy, and closer U.S.-Japan-South Korean trilateral

coordination. A close trilateral relationship raises the cost

for North Korean belligerence and defines the international community’s

terms for economic relations should the North change its

stance. The United States should therefore support the trilateral

coordination and oversight group process.

I think we must be firm and strong in dealing with North Korea,

but I do think that we should avoid unnecessary bellicosity or demonizing.

One of the welcome results of President Kim’s policy has

been the elimination of such language by the North both in the

media and along the DMZ, reducing the hostile atmosphere.

Finally, I think our policy should make it clear to the North that

it is in their interest to work with us in making the peninsula and

northeast Asia a more stable place, and to enable them to do that

finally without losing face.

I want to express my appreciation for the privilege of appearing before this distinguished

Committee today. I have been involved with Korea since I first went there

in 1946 in Army Counter Intelligence, later as an educational missionary from 1959-

64, and more recently as ambassador from 1993-97. Needless to say, it is a subject

close to my heart.

There are three parts to our Korean policy. The first is to maintain, with our

staunch ally Seoul, a robust and unassailable deterrence. The second is to support

the South’s initiatives toward the North to reduce tension and encourage Pyongyang

in opening up to the rest of the world. The third is for the U.S. to engage the North

in negotiations designed to end the threat of nuclear weapons and missiles on the

peninsula.

The U. S. must continue to invest in the U.S.-ROK security partnership.

The U.S.-ROK alliance has been extraordinarily successful at underpinning stability

in Northeast Asia and establishing a position of strength for South Korea

to test reconciliation with the North. Seoul has clearly stated that the U.S. military

will remain critical to its security even after the North Korean threat is

gone. It is consistent with Seoul’s efforts at reconciliation for the U.S. and ROK

governments to point in specific terms to the North Korean threat and to continue

reinforcing deterrence, particularly in the areas of counter-battery fire,

missile defense, and protection against weapons of mass destruction. The U.S.

should improve U.S.-ROK joint readiness in these areas and to begin preparing

the alliance relationship for a longer-term role in regional security.

South Korea has made important progress in tension reduction with the

North and should have U.S. support. Seoul’s strategy of cooperation and reconciliation

with North Korea has moved the political dynamics on the peninsula

in a positive direction. It is true that without a reduction of the North Korean

military threat and improvement in human rights in the North, diplomacy with

Pyongyang will only go so far. However, these should be the goals of policy and

not preconditions for the South’s efforts at tension reduction. Kim Dae Jung’s

focus on cooperation and reconciliation is the right way to begin the process and

is clearly in U.S. interests, and we should offer full support for his initiatives.

It is in U.S. interests to negotiate a verifiable elimination of North Korea’s

long-range missile program. Last year, North Korea appeared interested in negotiating

a comprehensive agreement to reduce its long-range ballistic missiles

in exchange for various inducements. Such an agreement cannot be achieved

without lengthy and deliberate negotiations followed by effective verification

measures. Nevertheless, the scope of North Korea’s proposal was unprecedented.

The North would prohibit all exports of long-range missiles and related

items in exchange for in-kind assistance in categories such as food. In addition,

the North said it would ban further indigenous testing and production above a

certain range in exchange for in-kind compensation and assistance with launching

commercial satellites. However, in working-level talks the North balked at

‘‘intrusive’’ verification, did not address already deployed missiles, and remained

vague about the exact threshold for ‘‘long-range’’ missiles.

The United States should resume talks on missiles in the near future, but

must make the bottom line clear: 1) effective verification; 2) elimination of long-range

missiles already deployed; 3) provision of in-kind assistance to the North

that would not include sensitive technology transfers; and, 4) movement toward

subsequent steps to reduce tensions and the conventional military threat. If

these objectives can be met, a broad agreement with North Korea on missiles

would be a significant accomplishment and would enhance both stability in

Northeast Asia and the South’s efforts at reconciliation.

In the meantime, the United States should invite its allies to review the Agreed

Framework, but there should be no unilateral changes by any party. The 1994

Agreed Framework has frozen North Korea’s known nuclear weapons program. Any

review should focus on both the remaining challenges to full implementation of the

Agreed Framework as well as potential opportunities to engage North Korea on a

revision of the terms to meet Pyongyang’s immediate energy needs. It is striking,

for example, that the North has recently asked for direct electrical energy from the

South until the light water reactors are ready. The South is under no obligation to

provide this energy and should not do so without linking it to the North’s obligations

under the Agreed Framework. Nevertheless, this new development suggests

that some reworking of the 1994 accord might be possible. The United States should

stand by its commitments and its allies and make no unilateral changes to the

Agreed Framework, and not accept any delay in the nonproliferation milestones contained

within it. However, circumstances may require a fresh collective look at the

LWR project.

The U.S. must also continue energetic trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan coordination.

Pyongyang’s new diplomacy is the result of three developments: the North’s desperate

economic situation, Kim Dae Jung’s patient diplomacy, and closer U.S.-

Japan-South Korean trilateral coordination. A close trilateral relationship raises the

cost for North Korean belligerence and defines the international community’s terms

for improved economic relations should the North change its stance. The U.S. should

support the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group process.

While we must be firm and strong in dealing with North Korea, it does not follow

that we must necessarily be bellicose or employ demonizing language. One of the

welcome results of President Kim’s policy has been the elimination of such language

by the North both in the media and along the D.M.Z., reducing the hostile atmosphere.

Finally, we must make it clear to the North how it is in their interests to

work with us in making the peninsula a more stable place, and to enable them to

do that without losing face.

It is certainly possible. Given North Korea’s

record it is going to be very difficult and, in fact, that was the reason

why the breathtaking offer that North Korea made was not

brought around to any kind of conclusion last fall, was because it

foundered on the very issue of verifiability.

Senator BIDEN. That is not what I was told. I spent over 3 hours

with Sandy Berger, with the Secretary, with Strobe Talbott, and

with Perry’s assistant, Wendy Sherman.

I understand it foundered on practical domestic political considerations,

rightly or wrongly, that since it did not get sufficiently

underway, that is, the verification talks, prior to the election, and

the election had already taken place, that the sine qua non for the

North Koreans moving forward was, they wanted an appearance of

the President in North Korea to sort of legitimize them. That is

something the administration was not prepared to do unless they

had a more concrete assurance as to what the nature of the discussion

relating to verifiability would be. By the time they got around

to that the election had occurred. The President was, I think rightly,

in the position of suggesting that President Bush had appeared

to have won, although it was being contested. The President did

not feel that it would be appropriate to go forward without consulting

President-elect Bush, or the likely President. And yet to do

so would have gotten the President in the middle of the election

process by, in effect, conferring on Bush the status of being elected

before that was followed through in the courts. That seems to me

different than having arrived, as I understood you to say, at a judgment

that the North Koreans were unwilling to deal with

verifiability.

Dean, do you have a view on that?

Well, if I may begin, Senator, I think that

first of all the issue of the peace agreement is one that lies somewhat

in the future. The more immediate issue, I think, for the

President of South Korea is the United States Government’s support

for its strong ally, Seoul, and its attempt to engage the North

in whichever ways are currently underway, and that eventually

would include an attempt to come to some sort of peace agreement

or peace treaty.

I think at this point the issue that faces the U.S. Government

is the extent to which it sees its relationship with Seoul as the primary

tie, and the principal foreign policy piece for the Korean Peninsula,

and growing out of that, then the support for that government’s

initiatives in engaging the North.

Parallel with that, I think it is necessary to so engage the North

in terms of trying to negate, as we have been talking about, the

missile threat, and that has many aspects of verification and so

forth.

The issue of how difficult that is going to be, and how protracted

that sort of a negotiation might become remains to be seen. I am

sure it will be both. Whether it is impossible, or whether it is not

worth doing, I think is another issue altogether, but I think at this

point the concern that I have about the posture of the United

States with regard to Korea is the growing concern in South Korea

that we are not fully supporting them, and they do not want to return

to the cold war mentality.

We can all bring a brief against the atrocities and the evil aspects

of North Korea, but the engagement policy of President Kim

Dae-jung has changed the dynamics on the peninsula, and even

though his popularity has plummeted, it is way down, there is a

broad base—maybe as much as 80 percent of the populace, in support

for a general approach to the North, some kind of engagement

policy that continues reducing tension, avoiding war, and finally

getting rid of the weapons of mass destruction, maybe leading to

a peace treaty.

So in all of that I am saying the first thing is, we need to let

South Korea know that we support them, and in doing that we encourage

them in their attempts to engage, but that also in our turn

we do the things that are necessary for us to do regarding missiles

and weapons of mass destruction, and I think that would be very

affirming, very strengthening for the South. There have been some

very blistering editorials in South Korean papers about what they

feel is a coolness toward the relationship.

Now, historically I would say for 50 years we have put as a

mantra that our relationship with Seoul is the most important

thing. We need to continue that.

Whether or not it is justified, the fact is, as

I understand it, Deputy Secretary Armitage carried a letter from

President Bush to President Kim supporting his efforts and I do

not know the contents, but in other words, of giving some affirmation,

which I think was very well-received. That was just in the

last couple of weeks. That kind of affirmation, they do not want to

be left out or feel like there is some sort of distance between us and

them, I think.

Well, I will speak very briefly, then turn it

over, but that is very true, and this is part of his decline in popu-

larity. That I think, if Kim Jong-Il of North Korea returned in a

summit to the South, that would greatly answer that barrage of

criticism.

We were talking about public opinion?

Well, I think that they have been reciprocated.

I think in the last 6 months there has been a noticeable

lull, and this is a cause of concern both in Seoul and in Washington,

obviously.

Well, I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think we all

are deeply concerned about the human rights abuses and the terrible

situation that the Doctor has dramatically set forth, and we

deplore all of this. I mean, you know, we can all agree to that. The

question is, what are we going to do?

We can say, well, we are not going to deal with them. All right,

then we are going to isolate them. Well, what does that lead to?

If we isolate them, then we take away all the leverage they go back

to producing plutonium and they go back to testing their missiles

because we have no leverage on them. Then are we going to go to

war? How are we going to stop that?

The question is not whether, but how we deal with them. I think

this is the issue, and I applaud President Bush’s release of 100,000

tons of grain. This is not a concessions. This is not rung out of us.

It is humanitarian. We all have a heart for this issue, and we are

all perplexed about how to deal with a regime we do not like, but

it is not going to go away, and we have to think about the fact that

while we sit over here on this side of the Pacific, our allies are 30

miles from the barrel of the long-range artillery, and we have to

be sure that our actions and our statements and our policies do not

further endanger our allies there and our 37,000 troops.

Now, that is a very significant issue, and this means that we are

not going to simply condemn. We are going to have to find some

way to resolve it. That does not mean we approve it, it does not

mean we bless it, but it means we are going to deal with it, and

we are going to deal with it tough, and we are going to lay down

the law, and we are not going to let them get away with things,

but they have not gotten—we have not been playing the fool.

We have gotten a whole lot of stuff here. It has been a meaningful

thing, and the South Koreans would agree they do not want to

go back to the status quo ante, to the cold war mentality. That is

a universally held position in South Korea, and they do not want

us to push them in that direction either.

Well, I think first of all we need to reopen

our talks with North Korea on the deployment and testing of missiles,

and bring those to some sort of positive conclusion. I think

if that happens that will open the door for a reciprocal visit of Kim

Jung-Il to Seoul, or wherever that summit might take place.

If I may say so, Senator, I feel that President Kim realizes he

is in the shank end of his term. He is not a lame duck yet, but he

is getting close, and I think he realizes that the viability of the policy

has got to succeed him, not just what he can accomplish himself,

what the broad-based support for a policy of engagement in

South Korea, supported by and abetted by a strong policy in the

United States, and I feel at this point that working together in that

trilateral coordination with Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington at a

high level is going to work.

Now, I do not predict it is going to work, but I believe it can, but

it has to be at a high level. It cannot be done at a functionary level.

People at that level in North Korea cannot do anything. They have

got to be up at the top, and I think that the appointment of Bill

Perry as special reviewer and envoy broke the log-jam, and while

it did not open every door it made a lot of difference, and I think

it really paved the way for the summit that Kim Dae-jung was able

to have with North Korea, and so I am very much concerned.

This is not a give-away or anything else. We need to take up the

cudgel on the terms that are acceptable to the Bush administration,

but deal with it and see what kind of deal they can get. Going

into it, there is nothing there.

You have got to engage them, and if we do engage them, I guarantee

you that that will be a support not just for Kim Dae-jung,

frankly. It will be a support for the people of South Korea, for

South Korea itself, and in the long run we have got to maintain

that strong relationship, otherwise we are going to lose our influence

on the Korean Peninsula, and they will fall into the Chinese

orbit. We are talking regional politics here. We are not just talking

about North Korea.